Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://dspace.udla.edu.ec/handle/33000/90
Tipo de material : bachelorThesis
Título : Constitucionalismo y democracia: un estudio crítico sobre la rigidez constitucional y el control judicial de constitucionalidad de la ley como mecanismos (anti) democráticos
Autor : Carvajal Gaibor, Jorge Wellington
Tutor : Noboa Jaramillo, Ivana Valeria
Palabras clave : CONTROL JUDICIAL;PROCESO DE REGULACIÓN;DERECHO PROCESAL;PROCESO JUDICIAL
Fecha de publicación : 2014
Editorial : Quito: Universidad de las Américas, 2014
Citación : Carvajal Gaibor, J. W. (2014). Constitucionalismo y democracia: un estudio crítico sobre la rigidez constitucional y el control judicial de constitucionalidad de la ley como mecanismos (anti) democráticos (Tesis de pregrado). Universidad de las Américas, Quito.
Resumen : La tensión que existe entre el constitucionalismo y la democracia, ha sido destacada por diversos autores, pues, el constitucionalismo propugna la existencia de límites tanto formales como sustanciales, dirigidos al legislador democrático, que están representados principalmente por los derechos fundamentales, los cuales al formar parte de un coto vedado, se encuentran restringidos y/o sustraídos de la agenda de cualquier poder político y protegidos a través de dos mecanismos, a saber: la rigidez constitucional y el control judicial de constitucionalidad de la ley, que bajo ciertas condiciones, resultan antidemocráticos…
Descripción : The tension between constitutionalism and democracy, has been highlighted by several authors, therefore constitutionalism advocates the existence of both formal limits as substantial, led the democratic legislature, which are mainly represented by fundamental rights, which to be part of forbidden territory, are restricted and / or withdrawn from the agenda of any political power, and protected by two mechanisms, to wit constitutional rigidity and judicial review of legislation, which under certain conditions, are antidemocratic. Antidemocratic in the sense that if democracy is conceived as an inclusive deliberative procedure for decision-making, such limits would constitute an offense to that, because not only the removal of the public discussion of certain issues where dissent prevails, but also to the transfer of decision-making about them to a judicial elite that has no democratic credentials of a National Assembly or citizenship. In addition, the requirement of enhanced majorities for reform of the aforementioned limits, violates the right to participate on an equal footing, which in the words of Waldron, justifies the higher intrinsic value of democratic procedure in respect of the judicial procedure, as a rule of collective decision for determining the content and scope of the substantive restrictions. However, as suggested Bayón, the choice between one or the other procedure, and ultimately the configuration of institutional design, should not rely solely on the comparison between the intrinsic values, but also their instrumental values. In this regard, the critique of constitutional rigidity and judicial review of legislation, should not be seen as an attack on fundamental rights, but constitutes a perspective that makes evident, incompatibilities of a particular assembly and operation of these mechanisms, with an equally valuable right, such as the right to participate on an equal footing. Consequently, you should consider the following approaches: a) that the defense of philosophers of law as Waldron, is no stranger to the rights, but is based on one of them, and b) an institutional design that should arise from a balance between the intrinsic and instrumental values of both procedures.
URI : http://dspace.udla.edu.ec/handle/33000/90
Aparece en las colecciones: Derecho

Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
UDLA-EC-TAB-2014-02.pdfTESIS A TEXTO COMPLETO1,03 MBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir


Este ítem está sujeto a una licencia Creative Commons Licencia Creative Commons Creative Commons